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Abstract
A sustainable innovation is more expensive than a regular one but it may lead to long term
benefits and durable competitive advantage, especially if many  firms from the network
collude or act within constrained environments such as business incubators. The opinion
formation process, which leads to sustainable innovation, may be viewed as a collective
cognitive process resembling that of branding and re-branding. Technological innovations
can be viewed as sequences of cost reduction events and, in a many-firm setting, social
learning which  leads  to sustainability-oriented  behaviour depends  on  (mutual)  trust
relations. The experimental modelling part of the paper illustrates selected aspects of the
concept just outlined by developing a stylized dynamic model of the firm.
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1. Introduction and motivation
The dual nature of innovation is undeniable: for instance proliferating high-
gain advanced financial instruments can lead to hard to imagine societal costs when
crises strike. Similar trade-offs are known or can be projected for a variety of “high
impact industries”, e.g. think of nuclear energy, deep sea oil rigs, personalized
medicine and many more. None of the down-side effects can be genuinely avoi-
ded,  but approaches,  which  take  into  account “checks  and  balances”  of  tech-
nological,  economic  and  social  forces  may  help  develop  less ad-hoc and less
aggressive  ways  to  cope  with  them.  Such  may  be  done  by  improving  the  as-
sessment of future costs for various degrees of acting in sustainable ways.
As a step in this direction, we propose to start developing a stylized model,
which places the innovating firm into the foreground and which illustrates aspects
of  the  dynamics  of  an  innovation  process  in  combination  with  investment  in
sustainability.  Such  models  can  be  viewed  as  first  steps  for  evaluating  more
realistic empirical situations, for which detailed empirical data are hardly available.
2. The role of sustainability, incubation and literature overview
In highly developed countries there are many types of incubator models,
perhaps best  exemplified  by  BTC  Twente  in  the  Netherlands  or  a  cooperation
between the Imperial College of Science, London, and the Judge Business School
of Cambridge University from the UK as well as by novel incubator arrangements
for foreign high tech firms, to be found in the state of Maryland, USA (reference
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been established (Bergek, Norrman, 2008). However, the difficulty of evaluating
incubators is related to the difficulty of measuring and assessing organizational
creativity as  described  in (Sullivan, Ford,  2009). Density  of  technological
connectivity between firms has an impact on the inventiveness of science based
firms, and somewhat surprisingly, venture capital has less influence on innovation
intensity than expected, as is found by Rickne (Rickne, 2006). Another frequent
situation is, where “… the impact of R&D on product innovation is mediated by
process innovation” (Raymond, St-Pierre, 2010).
As a synthesis, again for our aforementioned stylized model of the next
sections, we propose to use the following features:
· Find a plausible way to introduce some networking aspects between firms;
· Introduce  imitation  as  a  means  of  adopting  the  best technology  from  a
neighbourhood;
· Find a simple way to introduce trust into a network;
· Concentrate on a simple model of consecutive process innovations.
Owing to the complexities of directly modelling incubation as discussed
above, we propose to represent some aspects of incubation indirectly, for instance
by  relegating  to  interconnection  patterns  between  firms,  including  the  highly
relevant success factor of trust formation between economic agents.
3.  The model of a simple innovation process
Given a m´m interconnection matrix of process components of a firm, one
may model the stochastically varying costs ) (k cij occurring over consecutive time
steps ,... 1 , 0 = k by  computing  for  each  component m i ,..., 1 = the  total  costs
, ) ( ) (
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Î
=
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ij i k c k C with ) (i U  being the set of all components which component i
depends  on.  An innovation  adoption occurs whenever ). 1 ( ) ( - < k C k C i i   The
density function from which to draw new cost coefficients embodies the "difficulty
of reducing costs" 0 >  as in (McNerney et al, 2009), for instance f(c) µ ,
1 -  c
with this  proportionality  relation  stemming  from  an  assumed  cumulative  distri-
bution ò
c
ds s f
0
) ( µ
 c . The unit cost resulting  from  such an innovation-
adoption process computed for a technology matrix with inter-related components
and evaluated over sequences of such matrices is often similar to a so called power
law, which reads ) (y c µ ,
 - y with y  being the cumulated past production with
the  technology, and with (in  general  non-integer) efficiency or  power . 0 > 
Power laws are dependencies, which approximate data points by linear functions in
double logarithmic plots (here, if c(y) is plotted against y) and are very popular in
social network modelling (Newman et al., 2006).
The  cost  reductions in  the  cumulated  past  production  experience often
resemble power laws with the characteristic power  >0 in part dependent on theStudia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                    Seria Ştiinţe Economice  Anul 21/2011 Partea I
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size (and the past evolution) of the process component neighbourhoods ). (i U The
incubated firm should benefit from adopting (imitating) the best technology from a
given neighbourhood of firms.
4. A toy model:  innovating firms with investment in sustainability
Based on some venerable and also some more recent work on modelling
the innovation process from a theoretical viewpoint (Reinganum, 1981; Bessen and
Maskin, 2009) as well as on a variety of mixtures of theoretical, empirical, and
computational  approaches  as can  be found in  (Stöppler, Schebesch, 1993),  we
propose a simulation model starting with formulating a “mechanism” of period-
wise  innovation  effects  on  the  evolving  budget of  a  firm (or  financial  assets
cumulated  from  sales,  say).    In  this  model,  the   budget Q i (k)    of    the  firm
} ,..., 1 { N iÎ  from a sector of an economy is a dynamic variable, which can assume
positive  and  negative  values  over  a  time  interval } ,..., 2 , 1 , 0 { K k = , with  the
obvious goal of attaining Q i (K) > 0  and also maximizing Q i (K)  for as many
firms  as possible. Apart from being a goal for the single firm, doing so for a
portfolio of  firms,  i.e. maximize ) (K Q
j
j å
P Î
,  subject  to finding  a maximizing
subset } ,..., 2 , 1 { N Ì P , is  in  fact  a  goal  of  a  business  incubator,  choosing  to
incubate the firms fromP. In contradistinction to a financial portfolio, here a firm
sticks to exactly one incubator.
To explain the innovation related mechanism, we first assume N = 1, a
monopoly, where the effective demand quantity, which, for simplicity, shall equal
the sales , 0 ) ( ³ k X is measured in units of products and is given exogenously.
The evolving demand will certainly influence the success of a firm, regardless of
any details of the innovation process. However, innovation can make a difference
over  the K time  steps,  if  a  realistic growth  processes and  the  accumulation  of
delayed cost for producing and using ) (k X over time by clients and society is
considered. For a sufficiently narrow sector definition and a long enough time
horizon K > 0, no demand can keep growing indefinitely. We also assume that
delayed cost occur in cumulated past production, reflecting long term cost due to
environmental  consequences  and  to  social  disruption  of  many  kinds, due  to
destruction of diversity, distruction of social and intellectual capital, etc., which we
all collect  in  a  cost  variable . 0 ) ( ³ k D With  the  passage  of  time  independent
“private” innovation events occur, manifesting themselves by the reduction of unit
production cost. The price of a product unit is also assumed to be equal to one,
which  simplifies  the  following  discussion. With  this simple mechanism  for the
sources  of contribution to  the  budget of the  model  firm,  we now arrive  at  the
following equations of motion:
( ) ), ( ) ( 1 ) 1 ( k X A g k X + = + with , 0 ) 0 ( > X and with . 1 ) ( 0 < £ A gStudia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                    Seria Ştiinţe Economice  Anul 21/2011 Partea I
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In  order  to  produce  two  consecutives behaviour regimes,  we  set
0 ) ( > = const g A g  for all k such that , ) ( A k X £  and 0 ) ( = A g  otherwise. Hence
the evolution of the monotonous sales curve ) (k X  will switch exactly once from
geometrical  growth  to zero  growth.    Complications  induced  by  cyclical and
stochastic demand components as well as those owing to dynamic price formation
are thus avoided in this stylized model. Next, we state the evolution of the cost
variable , 0 ) ( ³ k D  which reflects the delayed  cost of producing and using the
product, being an increasing function of the cumulated sales:
, ) ( ) (

÷
ø
ö
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è
æ
= å
£k s
s X k D     with , 0 >       and . 0 ) 0 ( = X
Owing to the constant sales in phase 2 of the sales evolution, delayed costs
can eventually overtake sales revenues. Owing to the assumption of unity prices,
quantities  and  values  coincide. The  firm  can  counteract  the  accumulation  of
delayed  costs  by  investing a  share of  the  sales  revenue  into  developing
sustainability measures. Hence, there is a “policy” of diverting a share of the sales
into  such  long  term  purposes.  This  is  most  simply  expressed  by  a  variable
, 1 ) ( 0 £ £ k h   which may  be fixed  or  adaptable  over  time. We then have  the
following dynamic budget equation for the firm:
( ) ), ( )) ( exp( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( k I k I k D k c k X k Q k Q - - - - + = +   with ) 0 ( Q  given.
The variable ) ( ) ( ) ( k X k h k I =  stands for the sustainability investment of
the firm in period k. The term 0 )) ( 1 ( > - k c  means unit price minus unit costs (or
unit profits) in the extreme case of zero delayed costs and zero investments (i.e.
D(k)  = I(k)  =  0,  for  all k).  The  effects  of  delayed  costs  can  be  reduced  by
sustainability investment. For a plausible evolution over time, a suitable 0 > 
(usually  small)  has  to  be  selected. More  elaborate,  possibly  path  dependent
expressions could be used here instead, but their justification would need some
compelling sector-specific empirical explanation. The remaining item to be defined
in our model is that of evolving unit costs . 1 ) ( 0 < < k c  Their range necessarily
results  from the simple assumption  of  a constant unit price  of  1.  For  the  time
evolution of unit costs we assume that sequential innovations do decrease them at
irregular  time  intervals.  The  innovation  process  is assumed to  be completely
random:
), ( ) ( ) 1 ( k c k k c  = + with 0 ) 0 ( > c  given   and  with 1 ) ( 0 £ £ k  ,
with ) (k  being the result of a random draw in each k. A time point with innova-
tion occurs occasionnally. If k* is such a time point, then 1 *) ( *) ( < D = k k  . ForStudia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                    Seria Ştiinţe Economice  Anul 21/2011 Partea I
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all other time points, 1 ) ( = k  . If a random draw ) (k D from the uniform density
over the interval [0,1) exceeds a threshold of 0.8, say, then an innovation occurs.
The magnitude of the cost decrease in k* is hence bounded by (0.8, 1) times c(k*).
Figure 1 depicts budget evolution of the monopolistic firm (swinging curves) for
different  shares  of  sustainability  investments,  ranging  from = ) (k h 0.088  to
= ) (k h 0.4. All starting values of the dynamic variables are the same, the compu-
tations differ only by the formerly defined ). (k I  A time horizon of 100 = K is
used.  All comparative variants start with the same positive budget, pass through an
interval of negative budgets (need some  external financing) and  eventually can
outgrow  the  depth  with  different  degrees  of  success.  In  this  setting,  the  most
successful  variant  of  budget  evolution uses  (relatively)  high  shares  of sustain-
nability investment ( = ) (k h  0.4). Rather obviously, this property hinges on the
sales curve (continuous curve with discontinuity at a value of 7000) eventually
being overtaken by the delayed cost (continuous, nearly linear curve). The dashed
lines show the extend to which the influence of the delayed cost is diminished by
. 0 ) ( > k I
Fig. 1. Budgets of the stylized monopolistic firm for different shares of
sustainability investments
Source: original contribution
A convenient property of our simple model is that it produces a visible
effect in budget evolution akin to a “product life cycle”.  Finally all innovation
events are here the same (bullets on the ) (k Q  curves).
5. Adding interactions between innovating firms and some numerical results
Suppose that there exist 50 = N  such firms, say. As we intend to study the
effect of pair-wise interactions in a setting which  should be comparable to the
situations from figure 1, we choose to initialize all firm equations with the same
values. In order to enable some diversity, we sort firms by their initial sustainna-Studia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                    Seria Ştiinţe Economice  Anul 21/2011 Partea I
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bility  commitment  shares, ) 0 ( i h ,  which  we  assume  to  increase  linearly  in
, ,..., 2 , 1 N i = assuming  values  in  the  interval [ ] H , 0 ,  with . 1 < H Other  state
variables are initialized to the same value for all firms, e.g. ). 0 ( ... ) 0 ( 1 N Q Q = =
Interacting firms are modelled by using neighbourhoods ), (k Ui  which indicate for
every  firm } ,..., 1 { N iÎ   the  set  of  sufficiently  similar firms  the  production
technology  of  which  could  be easily imitated.  The  neighbourhoods are  re-
computed for each 1 ,..., 2 , 1 - = K k and N i ,..., 2 , 1 = by
}, | ) ( ) ( | , : { ) ( D k h k h i j j k U j i i < - ¹ " = using an upper  bound H D < for  the
distances  of  the  firms  within  a  respective  neighbourhood. While  the  shares
H k hi £ £ ) ( 0 may be seen as a proxy for sustainability commitment, the neigh-
bourhood size implied by H D < may be seen as a proxy to a degree of incubation
in the sense of facilitating access to knowledge within larger communities of firms.
The interacting firms thus obey:
· If there is no innovation event at time step k in firm i, then this firm is searching
for another firm j*  from within ) (k Ui  from which to imitate. Such a firm j*
may or may not be found in period k.
· However,  if  such  a  firm  or  source  for  imitation  is  found,  that  is,  if
)} ( : ) ( ) ( min{ arg * k U j k c k c j i i j Î < = then  set ) ( ) ( * k c k c j i =   and  also
). ( ) ( * k h k h j i =  Hence, technology of firm j* is imitated now by firm i and the
behavioural  imitation  is  to  switch  to  the sustainability commitment  of  the
apparently more successful firm j*.
· In  some  of  the  model  simulations,  a  most  simple  adaptable  sustainability
commitment, i.e. ), ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( * k h k h k h j i i   - + = +  with values , 9 . 0 =  and
0.5 is being used.
· In addition, a N´N trust matrix T is updated: at k=0 set , 0 = ij T  for all i and j .
Then  use , 1 * * + = ij ij T T   that  is, every firm j* being  the  source  of  imitation
receives a “unit of trust” from firm i.
The firms are initialized identically, with shares , 0 ) 0 ( ³ i h ranging from
0 ) 0 ( 1 = h  to , 85 . 0 ) 0 ( = = H hN  i.e. with starting values equally spaced over the
pre-selected sustainability investment range. Unless mentioned explicitly, all the
other model characteristics are left unchanged. We start with a situation without
any interaction between firms (figure 2).  Here the budget evolution (figure 2, lhs
plot) is mainly a consequence of the different sustainability commitments, i.e.
= = ) 1 ( ) 0 ( i i h h … ), (K hi =  for all firms i, and to a lesser extend to the history of
the individual innovation events (which are all unconditionally effective in this
case). The empirically forwarded “power law” of the unit cost calculated as aStudia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                    Seria Ştiinţe Economice  Anul 21/2011 Partea I
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function of overall (space-averaged series) of cumulated production with power
value of » -0.32, (McNerney et al., 2009), is shown as the straight line in the rhs
log-log plot.
Fig. 2.  The case with no interactions
Source: original contribution
This is compared to the data produced by the averaged innovation process
of our model (middle series of data points) and also to an “exponential law” (upper
curve), which is allegedly not assumed by the statistics of innovation processes.
The exponential curve is parameterized such, that its end point will coincide with
the last point of the model data. A cautious conclusion resulting from this plot is,
that  our  innovation  process  has  a region  of  almost  linear  slope,  making  it  a
presumably a rather suitable candidate for overall innovation process effects.
The  next  experiment  depicted  in  figure  3  shows  the  results  with  a
neighbourhood  size of D=0.055, which  enables  firm  interaction.  Here  the
adjustment pace for the sustainability commitment levels h(k) is set to a medium
value  of . 5 . 0 =    Over  quite  a  few  periods,  similar  “blocks”  of  firms  evolve
(upper lhs plot), using five distinct levels of h(k) (upper lhs plot), which is reflected
in  the  blocks  of  the  trust  matrix  as  well  (lower  rhs  plot).    Concerning  the
comparison to the power law statistic (upper rhs plot, see also figure 3), we find
that interaction of firms moves the curve of unit costs closer to the empirical power
law (lower straight line).
The experiment from figure 4 shows the same situation but with slower
adjustment pace of the sustainability commitment levels, namely with . 9 . 0 = 
Here diversity of firms is increased and also “smoothed out” over the firms and
over time (lhs plots and rhs trust matrix plot), while the averaged unit cost innova-
tion data of the model (upper rhs plot) move again closer towards the empirical
power law (compare to figures 2 and 3).
In the last experiment depicted in figure 5, which differs from that of figure
4  by  a  larger  neighbourhood  (D=0.15)  we  see  a  more  complex  adaptation  and
concentration of sustainability commitment levels (lower lhs plot) leading to more
successful firms (upper lhs plot). Two features of further potential interest appear
in the respective rhs plots: The averaged unit cost reduction or innovation data ofStudia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                    Seria Ştiinţe Economice  Anul 21/2011 Partea I
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the firms are moving still closer to the empirical power law curve (compare with
figure 4). These data also show intermittent phases with virtually constant slopes.
The second feature refers to the trust matrix. Besides being approximately block-
shaped, the trust matrix is also tending to form a band structure over all firms. At
least along the lines of this very simple model, it seems worthwhile to study such
emerging  features  in  more  detail  in  forthcoming  work  and  search  for  possible
generalizations  regarding  the  interplay of  innovation, of social  networking  and
learning as well as that of sustainability and incubation or other similar emergent
organizational groupings of firms.
6.  Discussion, conclusions and further work
In order to study the innovating firm with aspects  of sustainability and
effects of incubation from a modelling point of view, we constructed a stylized
dynamic simulation model. For comparative analysis, the model starts with a set of
monopolistic  firms  which  accumulate  a  budget  according  to  their  sales  minus
period-wise investment in technology, which ameliorates the long term negative
effects of using a technology or a product.
Fig. 3. Interactions in the neighbourhoods with imitation as described in the main
text. The rate for adapting the investment shares is . 5 . 0 =   Fast convergence to
five investment levels. The averaged innovation curve (lhs, upper plot) resembles
more that of a power law. Sustainable investment share concentration and trust-
block formation correlate and show very clear group formation
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Fig. 4. Same as in figure 3 but with . 9 . 0 =   The budgets are spread more
smoothly over firms space. The innovation curve move somewhat closer the power
law curve and trust block formation dissolves.  Group formation is absent and less
obvious. Can incubation or similar organizational grouping of firms bring any
benefits? Or is it not to be recommended in such situations?
Source: original contribution
Fig. 5.  Same as in figure 4 but with D=0.15. The budgets tend to become more
uniform. The innovation curve move still closer the power law curve and trust
block formation tends to form two bands around the main diagonal.  A more
complex grouping of firms shows multiple levels (original contribution).
Source: original contributionStudia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                    Seria Ştiinţe Economice  Anul 21/2011 Partea I
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All firms are subject to technological progress and some are able to recover
a positive budget until a given time horizon is reached, while some are not. A
second model variant introduces behavioural and technological imitation as would
be present within a network or an incubator. Within varying neighbourhood sizes
firms tend to reduce behavioural diversity and imitation allows more rapid spread
of efficient technologies, hence leading to better survival chances. A trust score
matrix  is  recording  actual  imitation  events which  lead  to  behavioural  and
technological  niches. Some  interesting  emerging  model  behaviour  is  found
regarding the resemblance of averaged unit cost innovation data from the model
and some power law observed in empirical innovation processes. The trust matrix
also displays some interesting features, which, in future work, may be fed back into
the imitation behaviour and also into a “reputation process”, which is  a useful
concept for accumulating both social and intellectual capital at the level of the
single firm but also at the level of a group of firms, for instance under the umbrella
of an incubator.
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